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a b s t r a c t
Is Google in its quest for search engine optimization through the creation of new tech-
nologies, which not only improves its search algorithms but also refines its search func-
tions for users, doing it in a manner that makes it a perpetrator of primary copyright
infringement or an invaluable facilitator for Internet functionality? How should the
balance of interests in the treatment of creative works be recalibrated in the face of
changes in search engine technology and operations, and the disputes that have arisen
within the last decade in the context of the digital age and its needs? Using Google as a case
study, this paper will look at the two main areas of dispute over the operations of infor-
mation locator tools and services that either threatens search engine functionality and
efficiency or weakens copyright holders’ exclusive rights. It proposes a concerted set of
solutions through a reassessment and amendment of copyright law to optimize the social
benefits and objectives of both the copyright regime and technological innovations in the
electronic model of information archiving, indexing and delivery. A fair distribution of
responsibilities and allocation of rights and liabilities will be suggested. In the process, due
consideration will be given to both public and private interests, with the former taking
precedence; while the recommended solutions will be made within the currently outdated
framework for Internet intermediary protection (i.e. safe harbor laws) and exceptions (i.e.
specific statutory exemptions and the general fair use defense) under the existing copy-
right regime. Thus, the proposed changes will be far reaching without being too radical
a departure from current law, an evolution that will likely be more acceptable and realistic
a solution to the problem.
This paper is published in two parts. Part One of this paper published in the previous
edition of the CLSR at [2011] 27 CLSR 110e131 dealt with the challenges to the copyright
regime posed by the operations and technology behind the Google Images Search Engine,
while Part Two will assess the benefits of the Google Books Search Project vis-a`-vis the
effects it will have on the scope of copyright protection. Recommendations are made to
copyright law to accommodate both functions while generally preserving the main
objectives of copyright protection.
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1. Introduction
Due to the various objectives of a modern search engine,
including its role as archiver, advertising agent, technology
innovator and search market optimizer, and because of the
idiosyncrasies of each type or form ofwork, in particular those
thatmanifest in the written, image and audio-visual form; the
manner in which technology is developed and employed to
serve Google’s role, function and operations varies and gives
rise to complications that the existing law does no adequately
or satisfactorily address. To put it in the context of the law,
one main reason for the divide between law and technology
lies in the fact that statutory immunity for Internet
intermediaries that would include search engines is funda-
mentally based on a lack of control over third party material
(i.e. enabling secondary infringement); whereas Google is
increasingly involved in various aspects and stages of devel-
opment and delivery of third party material irrespective of
source and legality and have in certain cases and in the
process and various stages of its services itself copied, edited
and adapted works and materials (i.e. perpetrating primary
infringement). Another reason is the conflict between societal
and private interests involved in the copyright equation; that
is, between default protection for copyright owners and
legitimate user exemptions, which are given a new dimension
due to the relatively new forms and uses that works are put to
in the digital environment (e.g. User Generated Content
(UGC)). The laws relating to Internet intermediaries have to
some extent addressed the rights, liabilities and responsibili-
ties of information locator tools. However, given the changes
since, and even during, the time of the creation of these laws,
they have left many issues and questions still open and
unresolved to a large extent, particularly those that have
arisen after the laws have already been passed statutorily.1
Given the lag time between laws and technological changes,
it is not surprising that it is left to the disputants and the
courts to grapple with the issues in the interim period.
A compromise legal solution is necessary because the law
and policy-makers can neither abandon the objectives of the
copyright framework and risk harming the creative drive and
multimedia industry nor the laws preserving the Internet and
theWWW that would set the world back from socio-economic
and technological progress facilitated by the digitization of
both medium and media.
In Part One of this paper, I had set out the relationship
between emerging technologies and the copyright regime, in
particular, the increasingly complex and diversified web of
search engine functions on theWorldWideWeb (WWW)with
their differential treatment of creative content in pursuit of
optimizing search engine functionality. Google Inc. was
introduced as the subject matter of discussion due to the fact
that it is the market leader in the business of search engines
and performs most of the controversial functions that have
given rise to disputes with various copyright holders. In fact, it
is at the forefront of developing and operating search engine-
related technologies. It has also been the main target for
threats of legal action and the main protagonist in instituted
legal proceedings on the issues relating to search functions
and operations, which is the focus of this article.
While the focus of Part One was on the issues surrounding
the functions of the Google Images Search Engine (GIS), the
scope of Part Twowill remain on the Google search engine but
specifically on the controversies generated and disputes
arisen with the creative industry in relation to the Google
Books Search Project (GBS). The main policy considerations
and some of the solutions recommended for the GIS that are
also applicable to the GBSwill be reiterated here. However, the
GBS will also have its own set of problems and proposed
solutions to meet some of its unique functions and objectives.
2. The objectives of this paper: the search for
a compromise
The focus of this article is on the legal challenges that Google
faces intwomainareasof itsoperationsrelatingto theexpansion
of its search engine functions, with a special focus on the tech-
nological tools that it had developed and is currently using to
improve its information location services. In Part One of this
paper, IhaveexaminedtheUScasesonthepracticesandfeatures
relating to the effective functioning of image search engines and
madesomerecommendations for legal reform. InSection Iof this
Part, I will examine the features of theGBS that sets it apart from
Google’s other information search services (i.e. News, Finance,
Scholar and Blogs) aswell as briefly consider Google’s attempt at
a private contractual resolution with a group of publishers and
authors in a settlement agreement, with a larger focus on the
likelihood of the legality of its actions under copyright law.
In Section II of this Part, I will recommend solutions for the
issues relating to the GBS Project through a suggested set of
legal reform within the existing Internet intermediaries’ law
and copyright framework in relation to Google’s functions, in
a manner that will also be applicable to similar functions
offered by other Internet intermediaries. Other legal issues
and developments relating to its functions under the project
will also be highlighted and some suggestions made thereto
for the sake of comprehensiveness, although they will largely
be outside the scope and focus of this paper. The proposed
reforms will involve either a stronger form of protection
through new safe harbor provisions, statutory exemptions or
a more comprehensive list of fair use factors.
1 See, generally, JulietDee, Fingerprints, GraceNotes andYouTube: The
Problematic Relationship between Convergence and Copyright Law, Paper
presentedat theannualmeetingof theNCA94thAnnualConvention,
in San Diego, California on 20 November 2008, synopsis available at:
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p259542_index.html. This paper
begins with a legal analysis of copyright infringement cases during
the past decade, focusing on the influence of convergence and new
media such as streaming video. Google Books Search has faced
protests from The Authors Guild, and Viacom has sued Google’s
subsidiary, YouTube, charging copyright infringement. One of the
questions considered is whether the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act’s safe harbor provision requiring notice-and-take-down (the
notice process) is adequate in protecting copyright holders’ rights.
See,also,PamelaSamuelson,PreliminaryThoughtsonCopyrightReform,
Utah L. Rev. 551 (2007), available at: http://privateweb.law.utah.edu/_
webfiles/ULRarticles/156/156.pdf and David Kohler, This Town Ain’t
Big Enough for the Both of Us - Or Is It? Reflections on Copyright, the First
Amendment and Google’s Use of Others’ Content, Duke Law & Technology
Review, No. 5 (2007).
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3. Section I - the Google Books Search Project
(GBS)
Theanalytical focus of this Part of thepaper is on the legislative
and judicial response to the GBS under the copyright regime
rather than on the private contractual settlement proposed
between Google and various groups of copyright owners or on
anti-trust issues.2 However, the provisions of the settlement
agreementwill be considered insofar as they provide an insight
intowhat theparties consider as fair vis-a`-visone another,3 and
anti-competition concerns and the orphaned works dilemma
will also be considered incidentally in the course of this anal-
ysis. An assessment of the potential hurdle that the Berne
Three-Step test may pose to the proposed law reform in this
paperwill also bemade,whichwill likewisebe applicable to the
arguments favoring statutory reform in Part One of the paper.
As the search engine that has a dominant position in the
marketplace of information, which functions as the main
indexer andgateway toWWWcontent on the Internet, itmakes
perfect sense for Google to maintain that position by a multi-
pronged strategic approach: Constantly develop technologies to
improve theaccuracyandefficiencyof its searchalgorithmsand
a user-friendly and individualized interface,4 create the most
comprehensive catalogue and cache of informational archive,
diversify its search engines according to the type of work that
a usermay seek (and in its business portfolio in that regard) and
leverage on its strengths as a search engine to appeal to paying
advertisers that target the same or similar audience.
With respect to some of its initial, fundamental and basic
functions, information locator tools like Google has generally
found favor in both policy and law, to the extent that they are
the beneficiaries of statutory safe harbor provisions from civil
liability for the information that they gather and index for
users. But as they diversify and expand in their operations and
as their role and objectives change, their functions begin to
test the outer limits of these protections and their justification
as they conflict with competing public and private interests.
Thus, with regards to the practices of caching and storage,
multimedia search engines and keyword advertising has faced
legal threats and challenges based mainly on copyright and
trademark infringement grounds. We have already seen an
example in Part One relating to the launch of Google’s images
search engine. Google’s practice in relation to the caching and
storage of literary works has faced different results. Although
they may seem alike in operation and general objectives, they
differ in relation to the content, the motives and intentions of
thepartiesand in themannerofoperation.Beforegoing into the
issues relating to the GBS, the concepts of “caching” and
“storage”willfirsthave tobedefined in thecontextof thispaper.
“Caching” is information uploaded primarily by copyright
owners or third parties, which is created and stored in the
poster’s computer or digital storage devices and subsequently
uploaded and stored in the Internet Service Provider (ISP)
servers accessible through websites that they create and
administer with digital addresses that they purchase and
maintain. Google’s value-added practice is in creating copies of
works in their databases to store for access even after the orig-
inal post is removed.5 Hence, any objectionwill be based on the
lack of expressed or implied license to access these works after
it is taken down, more so than while the work is still publicly
available on the WWW. In Field v. Google, Inc.,6 the US district
court for the District of Nevada ruled that Google’s caching and
display of websites from cache memory was a fair use and
hence it was not liable for direct copyright infringement.
“Storing” for the purposes of this Part will has a different
meaning andpurpose in relation toGoogle’s practices. It relates
to the active identification, selection, retrieval, duplication and
digital storage of otherwise offline non-digitized documents as
a natural prelude to the indexing and display of materials, in
2 For a critique of the problems in leaving the matter to private
settlement, see, Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The Dead
Souls of the Google Book Search Settlement, Vol. 52 Iss. 7 Communi-
cations of the ACM (July 2009), on why the Google Book Search
settlement agreement under consideration could result in an
extensive restructuring of the book industry and arguing caution
on the private settlement of a public issue or problem, especially
with implications on competition and on the rights of orphan
book authors that are included in the settlement in abstentia. It
also shows the problems with leaving what is essentially a matter
that should be resolved generally and publicly through laws to
private contractual settlement.
3 For amore supportive analysis, seeMatthewSaq,TheGoogle Book
Settlement and the Fair Use Counterfactual, New York Law School Law
Review (2010), available at: http://works.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article¼1006&context%3Dmatthew_sag, where
thewriter uses fair use to evaluate the settlement terms. Thewriter
analyses the provisions of the settlement agreement and compares
it to the likely litigation outcome based on fair use. The settlement
provisions are useful as they constitute compromises between the
parties based on what they consider fair to both and hence can be
used to help determine what will be fair practices that will lift
Google’s fair use defense, such as the sharing of profits, the creation
of institutions to manage the rights and interests of rights holders
and the special treatment of orphaned works. Hence, although the
writer writes from the perspective of testing the settlement on fair
useprinciples, thisarticledoes theopposite,which is toutilize some
of the ideas and concepts that render and bolster fair use with
recommendations for reform, and proposes practices for Google to
adopt in relation to works it intends to include in its GBS project in
order to best protect itself and strengthen its position should liti-
gation ensue (irrespective of settlement with a segment of the
author/publisher market and of jurisdiction).
4 Juan Carlos Perez, Google Revamps Search Results Pages (PCWorld,
5May 2010), available at: http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/
article/195652/google_revamps_search_results_pages.html.
5 Google has provided its cache since 1998. Google’s main search
engine scans the web using a “web crawler”, an automated search
tool which continuously scans available webpages on the Internet
and catalogs them into its user searchableweb index. In the process,
Google also caches the website’s source code in a temporary reposi-
tory on its servers. When Google’s search engine runs a text search,
links to the cached copy of the websites are returned in the index
alongside the full URL for the original page. By clicking on the cached
link rather than the original URL, the user views an archived copy of
thewebpage as it appeared the last time thewebsite was visited and
analyzed by the web crawler. Along with the cached page is
adisclaimerthat theuser isnotat theoriginalwebsiteandhyperlinks
thatmaylead to it.Othermajor searchengines, includingYahoo!and
MSN, alsouses the samemethodof cachingand featuringwebpages.
6 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). This case appears to
support the opt-out approach. It is for content owners to take
either technical measures or make a request to Google following
an online process to remove the cache.
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whole or in part, online. In 2004, Google began to collect, scan
and store literature without prior authorization from their
owners. It included content that could fall along the whole
spectrum between non-copyrighted works, such as works
falling within the public domain, to copyrighted works
includingorphanedandclaimedworks.The latter led tovarious
degrees and types of copyright infringement. The difference
from its earlier practice of caching is that here, Google actively
and with the participation and consent of a select group of
libraries, scans printed works without first seeking the
expressed permission of individual authors or rights holders or
through any possible implied license based on from the digiti-
zation ofworks and the public availability of suchworks on the
WWW.7
3.1. Brief history of development
Google beganasa search indexerandengine for informationon
theWWW, a large percent of whichwere literary. It also began
GoogleNews, a news aggregator service for users inApril 2002.8
Google Cache, Archive.org and other similar operations, repli-
cates and cacheswebpages as backups on its servers for access
by users after the original website is removed.9 Meanwhile
Google had been updating and improving its search algorithms
and display interface constantly to stay ahead of the competi-
tion.TheGBSthat comprisesof theGoogleBooksLibraryProject
(GBS)andtheGooglePartnerProgram(GPP)wasannouncedand
started by Google in 2004.10 The GBS,11 which involves the
scanning and indexing of book collections, was a project
headed by Google with the necessary cooperation of major
libraries to include their collections in Google Books by scan-
ning their collections into its database, which “like a card
catalog, showusers [bibliographic] information about thebook,
and in many cases, a few snippets - a few sentences to display
the search term in context.”12 It displays and allows the
download of entire books if it is out of copyright and in the
public domain, otherwise there will be links to online retailers
or libraries for digital purchases or ‘loan’ respectively.
As noted, Google Books functions like a library catalogue but
in the context of the ‘Internet library’. Google invests in and
provides the infrastructure and technology to do so, while the
library partners obtain the benefits of digitization of their
collections in return to further their larger objective to improve
access to, and the preservation of, the knowledge contained in
these books. After it indexes the books and places them in its
database, Google search users can use keyword searches to find
words and phrases as they appearwithin these books. Themain
viewofferedof literaryworks includedunder theproject involves
showing only bibliographic information about the book, in
particular the title, author, publication and content, and para-
graph snippets showing the keywords in context.13 Currently,
entire books will only be displayed and downloadable if and
when they are released fromcopyright protection, automatically
under law or voluntarily by the rights holder (i.e. the author or
publisher). They will also provide links directing the searcher to
online bookstores and libraries for purchase and loan respec-
tively. Presumably, Google is leveraging on this function in
anticipation of supporting its profit-driven and diversification
goals, by launching Google eBooks (previously Google Editions)
that enables Google Inc. itself to sell digitized books, while also
earning revenue from its ads placements and library subscrip-
tions.Meanwhile, theofficial ‘goal’ toutedbyGoogle is to “protect
mankind’s cultural history”.14 The main benefits are likely to be
inrelation to thepreservationofandaccess toout-of-printbooks.
Soon after Google Books was launched, it faced threats of
litigation,15 which has since led to negotiations and a settle-
ment proposal in the US with a group of rights holders,
7 Contrast this to the opt-in approach of Amazon’s “Search Inside
theBook” featureand theOpenContentAlliance’s “InternetArchive”
which are essentially based upon an opt-in consentebased model
with the cooperation of the rights holders required before scanning.
See, Jennifer Suzanne Bresson Bisk, Book Search Is Beautiful?: An
Analysis of Whether Google Book Search Violates International Copyright
Law, 17 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 271, 275-80 (2007). The writer also ana-
lysed the legality of the opt-out model vis-a`-vis the International
Copyright treaties and found that a mixed system of opt-out for
orphaned works and opt-in for copyrighted works with identified
authors or publishers (and presumably ‘no-opt’ for public domain
works)may be the best possible solution. Ibid. at 305-10.
8 See Andreas Pouros, Google’s Collaboration in News is Both Good
and Inevitable (Journalism.co.uk, 17 December 2009).
9 The “Googlebot” which indexes webpages into its central
database also saves the HTML portion which is the text and
payout without the images.
10 See theGoogleBooksSearch featureat:http://books.google.com/.
It was formerly called “Google Book Search” and “Google Print”. The
sister project is the Google Print Publisher Project (GPP) under which
a publisher of a copyrighted book authorizes Google to scan the full
text of a published work into the Google searchable database for
users to conduct searches thatwill yield resultswith information on
publications and relevant text as well as a commercial link for
purchase. There are no copyright issues implicated by this project as
it is opt-in and operates under agreement between the publisher,
which has the rights from the author, and Google. See also Kalev
Leetaru,Mass Book Digitization: The Deeper Story of Google Books and the
Open Content Alliance (Vol. 13 No. 10 First Monday, 6 October 2008),
available at: http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.
php/fm/article/viewArticle/2101/2037f, for a comparison of the
Google Booksproject to theOpenContentAppliance. For an example
of accessdigitizationbut one thatuses anopt-inmodel, see theOpen
Content Alliance website at: http://opencontentalliance.org.
11 See the thumbnailed cover pages of books and how they are
displayedonadigital bookshelf at:http://books.google.com/books/.
12 See “About Google Books” at: http://books.google.com/
googlebooks/library.html.
13 Ibid.
14 See also, archival projects (e.g. the Internet Archive, Microsoft’s
Live Search Books, Europeana, Gallica, Hathitrust, etc.) mainly for
preserving works, and access projects on websites (e.g. Project
Gutenberg, etc.)mainly toprovideaccess toout-of-copyrightworks.
15 As the project was started in the US, the leading cases also
emerged from the US courts. See, Authors Guild v Google Inc, United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Docket
No 2005CV8136, filed September 20, 2005 andMcGraw-Hill Cos, Inc v
Google Inc, United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, Docket No 2005 CV 08881, filed October 19, 2005. The
other plaintiffs include Pearson Education, Inc., Penguin Group
(USA) Inc., Simon & Schuster, Inc. and JohnWiley & Sons, Inc. See
also, Lawrence Jordan, Communications, Entertainment, and Sports
Law: The Google Book Search Project Litigation: “Massive Copyright
Infringement” or “Fair Use”?, 85 MI Bar Jnl. 32 (September 2007). See,
further, Kinari Patel, “Authors v Internet Archives”: The Copyright
Infringement Battle OverWEB Pages, 89 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y
410 (May 2007) and Branwen Buckley, SueTube: Web 2.0 and Copy-
right Infringement, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 235 (Winter, 2008).
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although there is ongoing government investigations and
resistance from other rights holders and interested parties.
The matter is still unresolved at the time of writing this
article.16 Currently, the settlement agreement is before a New
York federal district court awaiting approval and it is likely,
whatever the outcome, to face an appeal. Many relevant
parties from different societal groups with differing views
have registered an interest and have spoken out either for or
against the project. There are two basic objections to the
practice made by its detractors. First, investigations have
arisen from the government and complaints have been raised
from competitors based on anti-trust or anti-competition
concerns, which are currently being looked into especially in
relation to the proposed settlement between Google and US
authors and publishers.17 Second, copyright infringement
litigation had arisen that led to the negotiations for a settle-
ment, and objectors remain amongst those that reject the
settlement outcome, whether on some of the terms or in its
entirety. There are also those with other concerns such as
privacy and other civic groups.
3.1.1. The opt-out feature
GoogleBooksandhowitoperatespresents theclearestexample
of the opt-out model in effect. Google takes the pre-emptive
measure of selecting and copying or scanning books without
first seeking permission from copyright holders. Copyright
holders can also choose to opt-in through voluntary relin-
quishment of their otherwise exclusive rights by joining the
partner program or by entering into a settlement agreement
with Google. Otherwise, they are expected under the current
scheme toopt-out of theproject bydemanding thedeletionand
removal of their works that are scanned and uploadedwithout
their permission through a complaint to Google.
3.2. The issues
To understand and be better able to analyze the strengths and
weaknesses of each of their cases, it will be useful to break
down the acts that could potentially give rise to a cause of
action for copyright infringement.
3.2.1. First issue: scanning of books for archiving and
indexing - likely infringement
The right implicated here is the right to duplicate a work. This
relates to the active scanning and storage of hard copy docu-
ments in soft copy form, arguably a necessary action for
search optimization and comprehensiveness of online infor-
mation.18 The main stated objective for Google is to help
archive books, and to make them identifiable and more easily
accessible to the general public, through channels such as
Google itself and other search engines, library subscription or
purchasing options depending on the copyright status of the
document concerned.
Mainly, the objections are on the opt-out model of opera-
tion that turns the automatic protection rights model under
copyright law on its head. Copyright protection extends
automatically and by default and as such traditionally and
ordinarily requires opt-in arrangements and requests or
voluntary relinquishment of rights such as through
commercial sale and licensing or non-commercial licenses
such as Creative Commons licenses. The GBS scheme auto-
matically divests the exclusive rights under copyright law
from their owners by default.19
16 Steve Alexander, Digital Books Put on Hold (Star Tribune, 9 May
2010), available at: http://www.startribune.com/business/93147
534.html%3Felr¼KArks:DCiU1OiP:DiiUiD3aPc:_Yyc:aUU. Google
was sued in 2005 by authors, represented by the Authors Guild, and
book publishers, represented by the Association of American
Publishers. The two sides reached a settlement in 2008, but a federal
court never approved it because of concerns raised by government
regulators, public interest groups and Google’s rivals. An amended
settlement reached lastNovember is before the court, though it also
faces opposition. For now, scanned library books that remain under
copyright cannot be offered in digital form. Google can show snip-
pets of the books via its online search engine, but not thewhole text.
Universities that sent books to Google get the originals back, but the
digital versions of copyrighted books cannot even be offered to
library patrons unless the settlement is approved. Microsoft has
argued that the settlement “would give Google a de facto exclusive
license” to orphaned works, changing copyright law without the
consent of Congress. Amazon.com alleged the settlement would
not only be unfair to authors, publishers and others, but would
allow Google to fix prices for the digitized books unless a copyright
holder sets a different price. Public Knowledge, aWashington, D.C.-
based public interest group, praised the Google Books project for
spreading knowledge but said that Google should not get
a monopoly on orphaned works. The Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion, based in San Francisco, objected that Google could track
people’ digital reading habits.
17 Google’s argument is that the contracts it has with the authors
and publishers it is settling with are non-exclusive and that the
same service can be offered by competitors. However, the anti-
trust issues are more complex, see e.g., Randal C. Picker, The
Google Book Search Settlement: A New Orphan-Works Monopoly?, Vol.
5 No. 3 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 383-409 (2009);
Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Google and the Proper Antitrust
Scrutiny of Orphan Books, Vol. 5 No. 3 Journal of Competition Law &
Economics 411-438 (2009); James Grimmelmann, How to Fix the
Google Book Search Settlement, Vol. 12 No. 10 Journal of Internet Law
(April 2009); Eric M. Fraser, Antitrust and the Google Books Settle-
ment: The Problem of Simultaneity, Stanford Tech. L. R. (10 June
2009); Mark A. Lemley, An Antitrust Assessment of the Google Book
Search Settlement, Stanford Law School Working Paper Series (8
July 2009); Einer Elhauge, Why the Google Books Settlement is Pro-
competitive, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No.
464, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-45 (30 December
2009) and Christopher A. Suarez, Continued DOJ Oversight of the
Google Book Search Settlement: Defending Our Public Values, Protecting
Competition, New York Law School Law Review (2010).
18 Theproblemiswith thepassivity requirement for statutory safe
harbor, as “[t]he DMCA was enacted both to preserve copyright
enforcement on the Internet and to provide immunity to service
providers from copyright infringement liability for “passive,”
“automatic” actions in which service provider’s system engages
through a technological process initiated by another without the
knowledge of the service provider.”ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys.,
Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-796, at
72 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) and Digital MillenniumCopyright Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1989)). See also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at
47 (1976) (discussing thatCongress’ intentwhendrafting theDMCA
was, inter alia, to protect innovation and technology).
19 See e.g., Mark Hefflinger, Critics Say Google Book Settlement
Violates International Law Treaties, 10 May 2010, available at: http://
www.dmwmedia.com/news/2010/05/10/critics-say-google-book-
settlement-violates-intl-law-treaties.
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3.2.2. Second issue: public display of excerpts or documents
as search results - likely fair use
The ultimate objective to the practice of copying without
permission is to facilitate searches and identification by
Internet users of the source of a term, word or phrase, and
consequently the literature on a subject matter. In order for
such matching of user to material to take place, excerpts will
have to be provided in the index search results similar to what
is provided for information already available online. The
display of search results comes in two stages, at the search
results page stage in snippets or limited excerpts for user
identification and WWW ‘traffic directions’20; and a partial or
full display of a document as full document or in limited
excerpts in the holding page leading from the search results
hyperlink, which are created and hosted by Google, not pub-
lished by a third party on a public website.
This ismore of a fair use issue although it is to be noted that
its operation vis-a`-vis the books under the GBS is dependent on
the successful implementation of the project. However, in the
larger picture, it is source neutral in that it also, and probably
still mainly, serves what are already clearly legitimate infor-
mation and data that are currently made available on the
WWW by creators themselves. Information already expressly
or impliedly freely shared online include public domain and
voluntarily shared books, journal and magazines and other
professional and commercial publications, non-commercial
publications including government, civil, religious, and other
social websites as well as UGC via personal websites and blogs
(e.g. Blogger.com), social networking sites (e.g. Facebook and
MySpace) and applications (e.g. Twitter).
Both the above issues should be treated separately and
independently under the fair use analysis. Their objectives
overlap but also differ to some extent. For example, the first
issue emphasizes on archival and preservation purposes and
does not have a real impact on market value either way, while
the second issue is mainly determinative based on the fourth
fair use factor test.
As an overview, Table 1 shows Google’s treatment for
different sources of books under the GBS and the potential
approach for legal resolution and private settlement.21 It is to
be noted that these practices are still subject to change
pursuant to legal resolution under copyright and other laws,
and through private settlements.
3.3. Safe harbor and the DMCA
Noneoftheexistingsafeharborprovisionscover theactofactive
scanning without authorization by Google, which is a form of
primary infringement. The safe harbor provisions protect
intermediaries from liability for third partymaterial. Hence, the
United States’ Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe
harbor provisions for storage and information locator services
are inapplicableto itspracticeofscanningbooks forstorage.22As
for the display rights issue, that has already been noted to be
a fair use issue, although its legitimacy or otherwise can also
stem from the legality of the copying in the first place.
There are already caching fair use exemption provisions
under the DMCA. The system caching exemption limits
a service provider’s liability for keeping unmodified copies of
material for a limited time that is made available by another,
which a subscriber directs to be transmitted.23 Similarly, the
transitory communications exemption,24 limits a service
provider’s liability when it transfers digital information at the
request of another and in the course of that transmits, routes,
provides connections and makes transient copies of online
data. However, they do not cover the practices under the GBS
as they are premised on the basis that: First the works are
already made available on the WWW by rights holders; and
second, these forms of caching relates closely to the techno-
logical necessity in order for the Internet as a whole to func-
tion efficiently, and does not relate to the role of the Internet
intermediary such as an information locator service per se.
3.4. Fair use and the cases
In relation to literary works in general, there are both exam-
ples of non-infringing and fair uses ofworks in relation to both
of the above practices. For example, works, including books
that are already freely made available online by the rights
holders could be legitimately copied (and cached) and dis-
played based on the theory of implied license, and non-
copyrightedworks such as those that fall in the public domain
can be freely downloaded and shared.


















Library Project Yes Full Yes No
In-copyright with
publisher agreement
Partner Program Yes Full access
or 20% preview
No/Limited Yes (profit sharing?)
In-copyright,
no agreement
Library Project Yes Snippets only No/Limited No (orphaned works?)
20 Compare this to the thumbnail of images and full image
display in a new browser window. There may be more similarities
in effect if not in format.
21 Adapted from Eric M. Fraser, Antitrust and the Google Books
Settlement: The Problem of Simultaneity, Stanford Tech. Law. Rev.
No. 4 (September 2010).
22 17 U.S.C. x512(c) and (d).
23 17U.S.C. x512(b). There are alsouser caching fair use exemptions
for the downloading and temporary storage of files in the course of
WWWnavigation by Internet users such as the temporary Internet
files directory on the Microsoft Windows computer systems.
24 17 U.S.C. x512(a).
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There have actually not been any cases on theGBS that have
gone through the courts, mainly due to the ongoing negotia-
tions and investigations aswell as the judicial examination into
the settlement agreement made between Google and groups of
publishers in the US (and other jurisdictions like France).
However, an analysis based on the basic principles of copyright
and fair use and guidance from Field v. Google, Inc., Kelly v. Arriba
and the Perfect 10 cases can also be helpful in this analysis.25
Google’s principal substantive defense in the litigation thus
far brought against it on the GBS has in fact been based on the
doctrine of fair use. This is because the safe harbor provisions
and the purpose-specific statutory exemptions clearly do not
cover both of its practices that are in dispute. From an
assessment based on the reading and application of the fair
use factors, it would appear that its case of fair use is more
defensible in relation to the ‘visible’ display of portions of
works as part of its search results,26 rather than its ‘invisible’
archival practice of copying through scanning (the conversion)
and the permanent storage of books in electronic form (the
storage).27 Any outcome on its settlement negotiations will
only have limited effect on Google’s legal standing under
copyright lawwithout legislative and judicial protection for its
practices; otherwise it is at risk of infringement activity, at the
very least during the interim period between the inclusion of
a work in the scanning (and archival process) and the act of
opting out by objectors (and its removal by Google).
It is to be noted, before consideration is made of Google’s
practices here against the existing statutory exemptions and
fair use defense, is that the fair use test is a flexible tool and
have actually itself seen evolution to accommodate new
realities since its inception in the form of a doctrine of “fair
abridgment”,28 which eventually evolved into the fair use
concept that recognizes the utility of protecting some legiti-
mate unauthorized uses of what are otherwise exclusive
rights. Thus the concept itself is susceptible to evolution.
Under the general fair use exception in theUS,29 “the fair use
of a copyrightedwork, including.for purposes suchas criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringe-
ment of copyright. In determining whether the use made of
a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include: The purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted
work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to thecopyrightedwork as awhole; and theeffect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar
a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration
of all the above factors.” There are also specific statutory
exemptions, in particular the exemption for libraries, which
may be pertinent to this inquiry as well.
What are the types and forms of statutory exemptions and
fair use defenses that Google can rely on, and what are the
likelihood and the potential impediments to their success?
The following evaluation will be in relation to both these
questions (unless otherwise indicated):
1. Specific statutory exemption in relation to the first issue on
copying e Google can attempt to ‘piggy-back’ on the library
fair use exemption, perhaps identifying or re-inventing itself
as an outsourcing agent for cataloguing library books or
comparing itself to a library and functioning as such.30 The
spirit and objective of the library exemption certainly can
arguably apply to some extent to the archiving and indexing
purpose and practices relating to the GBS.31 But it is highly
unlikely to succeed under this provision as it is currently
drafted and in its current formof operation. For example, the
exemption is limited to only one copy per book or phonor-
ecord, made without purpose of either direct or indirect
commercial advantage, bya library or archive.32According to
Mary Rasenberger, Policy Advisor for Special Programs in the
Office of Policy and International Affairs of the Copyright
Office in theUS, Google couldnot be seenas a library, archive
or as an outsourcing agent.33 Similarly, it has been argued by
others that the Copyright Act’s library exemption does not
authorize systematic, deliberate reproduction of multiple
copies.34 In any case, the limitations under the exemption do
not serve the purpose and operation of the GBS as a whole.
25 412 F.Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006); 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003)
and 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) respectively.
26 Which is form or source and substance or content neutral;
that is, it applies to literary works in all permutations, not just in
relation to book search, for example, to news, blogs, etc.
27 A major difference to the temporary caching and storage of
information already on the WWW obtained from automatic
trawling of the WWW, even beyond the ‘life’ of the material from
its original source (see e.g., Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106
(D. Nev. 2006)).
28 See Gyles v. Wilcox. (1740) 26 ER 489.
29 17 U.S.C. x107. Notwithstanding the provisions of x106 and
x106A. The doctrine only existed in the US common law until it
was incorporated into the Copyright Act of 1876.
30 See, Hannibal Travis, Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes for
Authors, or Napster for Books?, 61 U. Miami L. Rev. 87, 123-126
(October 2006). However this safe harbor is unlikely to succeed
because Google is not and does not function as a library or its
agent, and it has profit-driven motives. See, 17 U.S.C.
x108(a)(1)e(2) (2006). The library exemption for reproduction is
limited to one copy per book or phonorecord made without the
purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage by a library or
archive that is either open to the public or to all researchers in
a given specialized field. Also, Google is a borrower and not
a library and is digitally scanning copies irrespective of the
conditions and limitations contained under the exception.
31 After the first case of copyright infringement case against
a library, the US Congress agreed that a library exemption was
necessary. See Mary Rasenberger & Chris Weston, Overview of the
Libraries and Archives Exception in the Copyright Act: Background,
History, and Meaning (14 April, 2005), available at http://www.loc.
gov/section108/papers.html.
32 17 U.S.C. x108(a)(1)e(2) (2006).
33 Tech Law Journal Daily E-Mail Alert No. 1321, Library of
Congress Comments.
34 Rebecca Tushnet, My Library: Copyright and the Role of Institu-
tions in a Peer-to-Peer World, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 977, 1007 n.110 (2006)
(citing 17 U.S.C. x108(g) (2000)). See also, N.Y. Times Co., Inc. v.
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). The court in the Tasini case, in dicta,
stated that the Copyright Act’s special authorizations for libraries
do not cover libraries reproductions of works because the Act
only authorizes reproduction of copyrighted works “without any
purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage”.
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However, comparing the legislation andpolicy intent behind
this exemption, there is good justification for it to be extended
by reform to a more general, institution-neutral, archiving
exemption,35 albeit with some necessary conditions and safe-
guards. Hence, the same or similar argumentsmade to support
the library exemption will also be useful for the proposal for
a new exemption for archiving in general, including search
engines as an archiving tool that deserves such protection and
that provides the same level of societal benefits as libraries,
achieving the same aims of knowledge sharing and storage,
perhaps with some limitations on its function and purpose.36
Similarly, the copying exemptions for backing-up of files and
other such specific exemptions that serve the same or similar
purposeas theGBScanbeusedtosupport suchanexemptionas
well. The archiving and indexing function (as facilitated by the
scanning and archiving of books) can be another socially valu-
able tool andvalid exemption, asare thecase for exemptions for
criticism, parody, satire, analyses, and so on. Moreover, the full
copying of books is a necessary prerequisite for a more robust
indexing function, where the same or similar considerations
and arguments from Part One, in support of the copying and
modification of images, can also apply.
2. General fair use exemption e Google can attempt to justify
its practices of copying, indexing and display under the
existing fair use doctrine, assisted by the court’s recent
more generous interpretations of fair use and its factors in
the context of, and application to, technological inven-
tions that have an impact or effect on the handling of
works.37 For example, fair use factors and additional
considerations can be reapplied in this context in
a manner that favor the GBS, supported by the following
arguments in its defense:
a. It serves the public goal of copyright law, to benefit
society through access to creativeworks, which should
take precedence over private financial interests. It also
serves to promote public access to information,
including public domain works and to open up access
to orphaned works thereby addressing market
failures.
b. Utilizing an interest balancing and balance of conve-
nience analysis, especially in the automated and
content neutral information-gathering context; it is
easier for a content owner to block or object, whether
preemptivelybytechnologyorsubsequentlybynoticeor
request, than for the search engine to seek permission
from each and every content owner for permission to
include their works in the project, particularly when
there will be problems with locating the copyright
holder.Thesamejustificationcanbeextendedtosimilar
enterprises for search and find functions.
c. Applying and extending the transformative use
doctrine under the first factor,38 which is a flexible and
35 See e.g., the European Bureau of Library, Information and
Documentation Associations’ (EBLIDA) position statement for the
European Commission’s Google Book US Settlement Agreement
informationhearing, Brussels, 7 September 2009, availableat: http://
www.eblida.org/uploads/eblida/10/1252227760.pdf. EBLIDA is an
independent umbrella association of national library, information,
documentation and archive associations and institutions in Europe.
They promote unhindered access to information in the digital age
and the role of archives and libraries in achieving this goal.
36 Meanwhile, holdout copyright owners argue that Google is not
the right agent or intermediary (but rather libraries are) to take on
this responsibility and project at the detriment of the copyright
framework. Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of Everything and
the Future of Copyright, Vol. 4 No. 3 UC Davis Law Rev. 1207 (2007),
available at: http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/Vol40/Issue3/
DavisVol40No3_Vaidhyanathan.pdf.
37 For fair use analysis under the existing factors to the GBS, see
Hannibal Travis, Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes for Authors, or
Napster for Books?, 61 U. Miami L. Rev. 87, 126-139 (October 2006);
Kinan H. Romman, The Google Book Search Library Project: A Market
Analysis Approach to Fair Use, 43 Hous. L. Rev. 807, 828-843 (Summer,
2006) (focus on the practical economic-and market-analysis
approach to the factors analysis to argue that fair use should be
made out, especially on the strength of the fourth factor); Melanie
Costantino, Fairly Used: Why Google’s Book Project Should Prevail Under
the FairUseDefense, 17FordhamIntell. Prop.Media&Ent. L.J. 235, 265-
276 (Fall, 2006) (with particular focus on the first and fourth factor
tests,determining the tool tobesufficiently transformativeanddoes
not usurp the market for purchasing, lending and reading books);
Emily Anne Proskine, Google’s Technicolor Dreamcoat: A Copyright
Analysis of the Google Book Search Library Project, 21 Berkeley Tech L. J.
213, 223-232 (2006); Manali Shah, Fair Use and the Google Book Search
Project: TheCase forCreatingDigital Libraries, 15CommLawConspectus
569 (2007) (the legal barriers to digital libraries and innovations in
information dissemination that are of public benefit should be
removed based on the fair use analysis and the “good faith test” in
the District Court case of Nevada’s case of Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F.
Supp. 2d (D. Nev. 2006) at 1118-23, which applied the four factors set
forth in the statute alongwith anevaluationof the defendant’s good
faith in evaluatingwhether ornot their copying constituted fair use);
Nari Na, Testing the Boundaries of Copyright Protection: The Google Books
Library Project and the Fair Use Doctrine, 16 Cornell J. L. and Pub. Pol’y.
417 (Spring, 2007) (argues that by new functionality that will benefit
scholarship and research, the Library Project’s use of copyrighted
works should be considered fair use); Thomas E. Wilhelm, Google
Book Search: Fair Use or Fairly Useful Infringement?, 33 Rutgers
Computer & Tech. L.J. 107 (2006) (analysing and concluding that
insofar as statutory exemptions are concerned, while the Library
exemption probably will not be available to Google, the fair use
exemption probably will); Aundrea Gamble, Google’s Book Search
Project: Searching for Fair Use or Infringement, 9 Tul. J. Tech. & Intell.
Prop. 365 (Spring, 2007) (calling it a close call according to howmuch
weight is put on each stakeholder’s interest); Elisabeth Hanratty,
Google Library: Beyond Fair Use?, Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 10 (2005)
(pessimistic of success in fair use analysis but urging a negotiated
solution or legal reform to preserve and protect technological inno-
vations with societal benefits) and Kyle Lundeen, Searching for
a Defense: The Google Library Litigation and the Fair Use Doctrine, 75
UMKC L. Rev. 265 (Fall, 2006).
38 Articulated inCampbell v.Acuff RoseMusic, Inc., 510U.S. 569 (1994).
SeealsoPierreN.Leval,Campbell v.Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter’s Rescue of
Fair Use, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 19 (1994) and Pierre N. Leval, Fair
Use Rescued, 44 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1449 (1997). A finding of trans-
formativeuse greatly impacts the overall fair use analysis favorably,
but it is not necessary for a finding of fair use. This doctrine have
been expanded to take into account and to accommodate techno-
logical innovations such as in Kelly v. Arriba (for image search
engines). It also squares with the treatment of earlier such technol-
ogies in the courts as in the Sony Betamax case (for time shifting), etc.
Contra. thedoctrineof consumptiveuse.A consumptiveuse is one in
whichdefendant’suseof the imagesmerely supersedes theobjectof
the originals, instead of adding a further purpose or different char-
acter.Whether ause is transformativedepends inpart onwhether it
serves the public interest.
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additional consideration to determining the “purpose
and character” analysis to include public benefits
through the use of copyrighted works that transcends
the original works’ objectives with “something new”
and that advances knowledge and the progress of the
arts. A search engine certainly can be argued to
provide these benefits through the coordinated and
greater reach that works can attain, transcending
cost, effort and in some cases means.39 In Kelly
v. Arriba,40 the Ninth Circuit case that held the display
of thumbnail images in an Internet search engine to be
a fair use based on this doctrine.41 In Field v. Google,
Inc.,42 the district court for the District of Nevada also
ruled Google’s storage and display of websites from
cache memory to be fair use. These cases, the
reasoning of the parties and the approach the courts
have taken in applying the law are pertinent to the
issue in this case.43
d. In relation to the second factor on the nature of
copyrighted works, an analogy can be drawn to the
case of Harper and Row Publishers Inc v. Nation Enters.44
The fact that all the scanned works have already
been published also adds to the credibility of the
application of the fair use doctrine in this case.45 In
a similar vein, the majority of books scanned are
fact-based books that may be more relevant for
research purposes and this may also weigh favorably
for a fair use assessment as well. 46 Also, there are
arguments in favor of such uses with respect to
orphaned works, where there are economic argu-
ments of market failure and lack of accessibility
under the current copyright system,47 and rare and
out-of-print works as well as works that are difficult
to obtain within a reasonable time or at a non-
exorbitant price.
e. Taking into account the fact that copying is not the
goal but the means (‘incidental copying’) and that the
scanning itself although technically infringing does
not have a significant negative effect for copyright
owners (which can be compared to the caching and
temporary files exemptions), and may even have
positive effects for them such as providing free
marketing and exposure.48 On the other hand,
archiving and preservation of information for future
generations is itself of important social interest. There
are other value-added functions arising from the
combined effects of increasingly comprehensive
archiving and indexing such as a more accurate cita-
tion count and cross-referencing of literary works.
f. The non-dilution of the works’ value and other fair use
factors that favor copying for indexing can outweigh
39 Hal R. Varian, The Google Library Project (2006), available at:
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/%7Ehal/Papers/2006/google-
library.pdf, applying the fair use factors test as applied in the Kelly
v. Arriba case to the design mechanism and objectives of the GBS;
and also noting that “copying is incidental” to the project. The
main difference between the image search engine or GIS and the
GBS is that, in the case of the former, the content owners
voluntarily uploaded their images onto the WWW much like
caching, unlike in the case of the GBS, where the books are
actively scanned and put into the search databases by Google,
albeit also to enable search capabilities.
40 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).Arriba Soft’s thumbnail-generating
Internet search engine (copy, modify and adapt) and display of
thumbnail images constituted fair use. This more expansive
application of the Campbell v. Acuff Rose transformative use test in
the Ninth Circuit have not as yet spread to the other Circuits. The
SecondCircuit, for example, haveadheredmore closely to a narrow
application in the cases of Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley
Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 2006) and Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244
(2d Cir. 2006). See, Matt Williams, Recent Second Circuit Opinions
Indicate That Google’s Library Project is not Transformative, 25 Cardozo
Arts & Ent. L.J. 303 (2007). In relation to indexing and display, it is
possible forGoogle todrawananalogywith thiscasesince theuseof
snippets from the original book may be similar to the use of
thumbnails in Kelly v. Arriba and the Perfect 10 cases. Similarly, in
relation to copying and archiving, it can be argued that the repli-
cation and thumbnail repository is required for the indexing func-
tionandto fulfill essential comprehensivesearchengine functionof
all available online content as well to render non-online content
digitized andhence recognizable (giving themgreater exposureand
reputation) and identifiable (matching content to author and other
bibliographic information) on the electronic platform. In anticipa-
tion of an increasingly fully digitized era of communication and
knowledge-sharing, a oremodern, safer and supplemental storage
facility andmodel is also important. The lessons of the huge loss of
literature of the past can serve as a warning to a lack of compre-
hensive archival facilities and operations (although a different
problem of the proliferation of inaccurate and useless information
can also emerge as a result, which requires a separate set of
solution).
41 However, in Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D.
Cal. 2006), the district court for the Central District of California
held that the GIS, an images search engine very similar to that in
Kelly v. Arriba,was likely not a fair use based on distinctions in the
facts and functions. Google was more commercial and
consumptive in its creation and use of thumbnail images for its
image search function and Perfect 10’s market in thumbnail-
sized images on cellphones tipped the analysis towards unfair
use. But see, Perfect 10, Inc v Amazon.com, Inc, 487 F 3d 701 (CA 9,
2007). In the appeal, this decision was overturned.
42 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
43 Cameron W. Westin, Is Kelly Shifting under Google’s Feet? New
Ninth Circuit Impact on the Google Library Project Litigation, 2007 Duke
L. & Tech. Rev. 2 (2007).
44 471 US 539, 564 (1985).
45 Hannibal Travis, Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes for
Authors, or Napster for Books? University of Miami Law Rev., Vol 61,
601 (2006).
46 See also, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States 487 F.2d, 1345
(Ct. Cl. 1973). The law allows copying without permission if it
promotes the public access to information rather than the mere
ripping off of creative works. In this case, the court found that
a medical library did not violate the copyrights of publishers of
medical books.
47 Steven Hetcher, The Half-Fairness of Google’s Plan to Make the
World’s Collection of Books Searchable, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L.
Rev. 1, 76 (Fall, 2006), available at: http://www.mttlr.org/
volthirteen/hetcher.pdf. (“courts are social welfare maxi-
mizers”), arguing that the major category of works owned by
publishers should not be a fair use, but that the same transaction
cost argument against fair use in the context of the publisher
texts would support it in the context of orphaned works (market
failure situation).
48 KinanH.Romman,TheGoogleBookSearchLibraryProject:AMarket
Analysis Approach to Fair Use, 43 Hous. L. Rev. 807 (Summer, 2006).
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the amount and substantiality of the copied work.49
The same factor is also less unfavorable with respect
to public display because of Google’s current gradu-
ated policy and practices on it. This factor has to be
analyzed in the context of other factors. For example,
it can also indicate the likelihood and degree ofmarket
harm under the fourth factor.50
g. In relation tocommercialismandmarketeffects,which
is the fourth elucidated fair use factor, the effect on the
work’s value (both commercial, meaning financial
market value; and non-commercial, in terms of popu-
larity and exposure) is one of the stronger arguments
that can be made by Google based on the extended
reach that its platform provides through indexing and
Internet access, which are more tangible and provable
bases than in the Sony Betamax case itself that still
yielded fair use as a successful defense. In evaluating
the fourth factor, courts often consider two kinds of
harm to the potentialmarket of the originalwork: First,
courts consider whether the use in question acts as
a direct market substitute for the original work; and
second, courts also consider whether potential market
harm might exist beyond that of direct substitution,
such as in the potential existence of a licensingmarket.
These factors appear to favor the GBS.
h. As the fair use factors listed are non-exhaustive, the
“equitable rule of reason” that is built-into the fair use
doctrine allows for flexibility in additional reasoning.51
Indexing is certainly significant and navigability is
importantastheInternetandthebodyofmaterials,with
varying degrees of quality, which are available on the
WWW increases exponentially. Knowing that there are
actually materials available on a subject, identifying
sufficient information inorder toobtain it, actuallybeing
able to get it at a reasonable cost especially for rare, out-
of-print and expensive books and having informed
choice andoptionscanempower society asawhole.52 In
fact, the “possibility of obtaining thework or adaptation
within a reasonable time at an ordinary commercial
price” is already a fifth factor in some jurisdictions.53
The court’s customary favorable slant towards useful
technologies that empowers individual users vis-a`-vis the
protection of creative works can work to Google’s advantage.
This can be seen from the trend of cases since the Sony Beta-
max case, which have been credited for the flourishing of
modern communications technology and that have led to
subsequent innovations in the field and the IT boom.
3.5. Other developments and issues
3.5.1. Private settlement agreements
Currently Google has reached a settlement agreement on the
class action suit by the Authors Guild and the Association of
American Publishers.54 However its legality is still being
tested in the courts. It is awaiting approval in a federal
district court in New York and is not resolved at the time of
writing of this article.55
The proposed settlement arose out of the case Authors
Guild, Inc. et al. v. Google Inc.,56 which Google is trying to settle
without admitting liability.57 The settlement is mainly
premised on a profit-sharing basis with Google sharing
advertising, institutional subscription and book sale revenue
with rights holders. The settlement is subject to approval by
the courts and also from the governmental anti-competition
watchdog. Under the terms of settlement the snippets dis-
played will remain the lowest common denominator. There
are also other heightened forms of display including for
preview use (the extent of which is determined by individual
rights holders) and public access service (for users at public
libraries in accordance with the library fair use). There is
some form of choice or control offered to rights holders to
claim and “manage” their works, which will be administered
by Google and its agent such as determining how much
49 This has not of itself barred a fair use determination. See e.g.
Sony Corporation of America et al. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. et al.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984) and, Kelly v. Arriba Soft, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir.
2003).
50 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994).
51 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990).
52 The US Supreme Court has stated that “[c]reative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ulti-
mately serve the cause of promoting the broad public availability
of literature, music, and the other Arts.” Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
53 See e.g., section 35(2)(e) of the Singapore Copyright Act (Cap.
63).
54 See, the Google website on the “Google Books Settlement”,
available at: https://sites.google.com/a/pressatgoogle.com/google
bookssettlement/home. Among others, Google plans to leverage
on itseffortswithpayoffs fromthesellingofdatabasesubscriptions
to libraries, selling digitized books through its Google eBooks store
andplacingadvertisementsagainst search result snippetsofbooks.
It is also at various stages of negotiation and settlement in other
jurisdictions. See e.g., Benedicte Page, French Deal may Break Dead-
lock between Google and Publishers (Guardian.co.uk, 18 November
2010), available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2010/nov/18/
digital-deal-hachette-livre-google and Alex Diaz-Ferguson, Le Goo-
gle Strikes Deal in La France: Largest French Publisher to Provide Books to
be Scanned by Google (IP Brief,WashingtonCollege of Law, American
University, 22 November 2010), available at: http://www.ipbrief.
net/2010/11/22/le-google-strikes-deal-in-la-france-largest-french-
publisher-to-provide-books-to-be-scanned-by-google/.
55 For an overview of the sequence of events and the state of play
thus far, see Jonathan Band, The Long and Winding Road to the
Google Books Settlement, 9 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 226 (2009),
setting out all the parties and issues as well as the sequence of
events from the launch of the project to the current state of liti-
gation and settlement efforts. See also, Lawrence Jordan, The
Google Book Search Project Litigation: “Massive Copyright Infringement”
or “Fair Use”? 86 MI Bar Jnl. 32 (September 2007), for a short
synopsis of the facts and issues surrounding the New York liti-
gation between. See further, Jonathan Band, The Google Library
Project: The Copyright Debate, (OITP Technology Policy Brief,
American Library Association, January 2006), available at: www.
policybandwidth.com/doc/googlepaper.pdf and Jonathan Band,
The Google Print Library Project: A Copyright Analysis, available at:
http://www.policybandwidth.com/doc/googleprint.pdf.
56 Case No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Lawsuits have also been
launched in other countries like Germany, France and China.
57 See: http://books.google.com/googlebooks/agreement/ and
http://books.google.com/booksrightsholders/.
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preview to display, whether advertisements can be dis-
played on its dedicated webpage, whether to allow sharing
of book annotation by users, and so on. The most drastic
option is to opt-out of the project. These arrangements,
however, do not sufficiently take into account the benefits
that Google retains for itself from the treatment of orphaned
works or rights holders that do not make a claim for what-
ever reason, although the Book Rights Registry is supposed
to help locate rights holders. Also, the main objection is still
Google’s default practices in dealing with the literary works
and the need for rights holders to ‘take back’ those rights by
opting-out, which under existing copyright law is still a right
that resides in the latter by default.58
Thus, these settlement arrangements do not resolve the
fundamental question of the legality of its operations. But they
do offer some idea on what practices can render its dealings
under the GBS as fair and for Google to reconstitute its func-
tions under GBS including the making of fair remunerations,
such as royalty payments for non-public domain works from
revenues earned from ads, subscriptions and sales.59,60 Also,
public domain works are clearly permitted while there are also
clear societal benefits of an opt-out procedure for orphaned
works. Currently, Google offers three choices to copyright
owners, which is to join the GPP or partner program (actual opt-
in), the GBS (default opt-in) or neither of the two (actual opt-
out). There is much scope for it to adapt its practices and
policies to better improve its chances of fair use exemption.
Meanwhile a reform of the safe harbor or fair use doctrine can
be considered in order to accommodate the GBS.
3.5.2. Google eBooks
Meanwhile, Google is seeking to benefit from linking its
Books Project to the Google eBooks (previously Google
Editions) store,61 and offers its database of scanned books
for library subscriptions. The eBooks store was opened to
US customers on 6 December 2010. This is not a problem
insofar as copyright law is concerned as there is no real
conflict of interest, although there is obviously a conver-
gence of interests and symbiosis, in Google’s practices with
regard to its Books Search program and its diversification
into the sale of books arena. It is relevant where profit-
driven motives is a factor and there may also be anti-
competition concerns.
3.5.3. Anti-competition concerns
The other more contentious parts of the settlement, however,
pertain to Google’s increased dominion in the area of
competition law. For instance, the settlement authorizes
Google to sell books62 in the digital form, to be read online via
Google’s servers. With the Registry acting as the go-between,
Copyright owners would then be able to set their own prices,
or delegate such pricing decisions to Google.63 Further, Google
will also expand on its current services by offering compre-
hensive subscription services to libraries, companies,
colleges, schools, and other institutions.64 The settlement,
further, permits the creation of a huge research database of
every book in the collection, allowing researchers to conduct
automated studies that involve computer-based analysis of
large numbers of books simultaneously.65
Although competition law and issues are complex and
outside the scope of this article, and while the anti-trust
inquiry into the settlement agreement in the US courts
remains outstanding, it is contended that there are ways to
achieve its objectives and continue its functions without
contravening competition objectives. For example, one
possible method to achieving both objectives is to require the
cross-carriage sale of background information on books (e.g.
author, copyright duration, etc.) and scanned databases such
as through a compulsory licensing scheme.
3.5.4. The interests of creators of “orphaned works”
Orphaned works is of particular concern as it encompasses
a group of creators that may be disenfranchised by the
proposed reform. However, legislative and executive solutions
can be found.66 For example, a form of “unclaimed works
fiduciary” may perhaps be the solution. Legislation can create
an independent institution to delegate the responsibility of
the collection of a fixed rate of royalties under a statutory
royalty scheme for the use of orphaned other works and
58 Google still asserts the fair use right in this case to have copied
the work in advance before the opt-out is made. This allows
Google to act first and refrain later. Under the current settlement
provisions, it is stated that “Although Google has no obligation
under the settlement to comply with such request, Google has
advised the Settlement Administrator that its current policy is to
voluntarily honor such requests and refrain from digitizing your
books or, if they have already been digitized, refrain from dis-
playing them”.
59 Right to digital publication can be separated from that for the
physical analogue and both can be licensed separately or collec-
tively. See, Random House Inc. v. Rosetta Books 150 F. Supp. 2d 613
(2001) and New York Times v. Tasini 533 U.S. 483 (2001). See further,
Robert A. Preskill and Charles McCarthy, Google Print: Snippets of
Infringement, 23 Ent. & Sports Law. 1 (Summer, 2005), on author’s
rights vis-a`-vis publishers and Google in relation to the GPP
program.
60 Even the yellow pages or other indexers have direct or indirect
financial motives through their services. The issue here is
whether and how copyright owners should be remunerated for
the indexing of their works (which requires wholesale copying,
even if not display) for which they also obtain a benefit from
a potentially bigger market.
61 Originally slated to operate from July 2010, see Stuart Turton,
Google Becomes Book Seller in July (PCPro, 5 May 2010), available at:
http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/357712/google-becomes-book-
seller-in-july. The e-books will be “device agnostic”, in other
words it will be fully compatible and device neutral.
62 Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 1:
2005cv08136 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2008), at x 4.2.
63 Ibid. at x 4.2(b).
64 Ibid. at x 4.1.
65 Ibid. at x 7.2(d).
66 Ryan Andrews, Contracting Out of the Orphan Works Problem:
How the Google Book Search Settlement Serves as a Private Solution to
the Orphan Works Problem and Why It Should Matter to Policy Makers,
19 Cal. Interdis. L.J. 97 (Fall, 2009), suggesting as a viable alter-
native to a statutory solution the private market solution offered
by Google in its Book Search Settlement, which creates a new
Collective Rights Organization called the Book Rights Registry to
locate and pay rightsholders for Google’s use of their works, and
which gives Google the right to make productive use of orphaned
works without the need to first locate and obtain the permission
of the copyright holders of the orphaned works.
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licensing these works to third parties for uses that would
otherwise constitute infringement, from which authors can
then claim royalties upon adequate proof and prospectively
re-claim their rights as well (if the rightful owner of so-called
“orphaned works” emerges to lay claim to them).
3.6. Problems with current state of law
As noted, without any safe harbor protection or specific stat-
utory exemption, the only recourse for Google is to acquit itself
under the general fair use exception, which is not likely to
protect it from primary infringement liability at least for the
first issue on copying. Also, pending a legislative decision on it,
Google faces the fundamental problem that is its opt-outmodel
of operationwhich is in direct conflictwith copyright law. It has
already faced and deflected one major lawsuit on copyright
infringement for the time being but it will likely continue to
face increased challenges and criticisms on its GBS as it
expands its operations in volume and jurisdictionally.
In relation to the first issue, the private solutions are
piecemeal, arbitrary and do not take into account the larger
policy and social interests and objectives. They are jurisdic-
tion-based and can develop into a complicated network of
disparate agreements with different terms. The most appro-
priate solution will be statutory amendment of either the safe
harbor privileges or a new exemption provision. With regards
to the second issue, the institution of fair practices together
with more clarity in the law, under the general fair use anal-
ysis and an augmented list of factors can resolve the issue and
is the more appropriate recourse. This augmented list of fair
use factors will complement and overlap with those that will
be just as applicable to the GIS, GVS and other search engine
operations.
3.7. Proposed solution under the law
The interests of society and the consumer are paramount, and
private interests are subsidiary and tied to those interests.
Even copyright law itself, which is primarily to incentivize
creativity by creating property-like interests and rights in
creative works, is ultimately with the purpose of benefiting
mankind. One of the most important things about the digiti-
zation of books and the practice of ‘digitally re-mastering’
library catalogues is the ease and ability to store in multiple
copies (duplicate) and to share (distribute) creative works, and
most importantly, to archive and save works that may easily
be lost. Universal access to knowledge over time and space is
at stake.
The solutions for both issues require different amendments
in the law. The first issue regarding copying is better
approached as a safe harbor or specific exemption based on
archiving objectives while the second issue, which can be
developed into fair practices can be resolved throughmore fair
use considerations and changes in Google’s practices itself to
render it compliant with the fair use factors. Straddling both is
the indexing function, which should also be protected by either
approach or both. The recommendations are as follows:
1. In relation to the practice of scanning under the GBS, the
law should provide a safe harbor provision for the
duplication for storage of works for archiving, indexing
and cataloguing either as a safe harbor or through
a specific statutory exemption,67 rather than relying on
the general fair use analysis and on existing and addi-
tional factors to determine the issue. Similar to the
proposal for GIS, the same “removal request process” can
also operate here to allow copyright owners to opt-out of
the project.
2. In relation to the practice of displaying various portions of
excerpts or extracts of the books under the GBS, and for
information results generally, a reformulation and re-
interpretation of the copyright fair use factors is most
suitable.68 There are two approaches, which are comple-
mentary and can be applied cumulatively:
a. The first approach is to update the fair use factors by
supplementing the existing factors with additional
considerations through expressly incorporating addi-
tional factors, and amending the scope and objectives
of the existing ones to take into account the benefits of
technological innovations and to bring into the equa-
tion other important considerations, some of which
have already been recognized by the courts. The
reform should be through new or augmented factors
that will accommodate the functions of search engines
such as the display of search results based on the
understanding that the ultimate test of fair use and the
reason for its interpretative flexibility is that it
concerns whether the copyright law’s goal of
promoting human creativity are better served by
allowing the use relative to preventing it. The factors
provide guidance that leads to greater certainty and
more cohesive decisions. They should remain non-
exhaustive.
b The second approach is the interpretation of the
existing fair use factors. This is not really law reform,
but more like part of an ongoing process of organic re-
interpretation of the flexible fair use doctrine for the
Internet context. This has been done most notably in
67 For a law and economic analysis in favor of fair use, see, Frank
Pasquale, Copyright in an Era of Information Overload: Toward the
Privileging of Categorizers, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 135 (January 2007),
available at: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/publications/vanderbilt-law-
review/archive/volume-60-number-1-january-2007/download.aspx?
id¼2534. The writer proposes a revision of fair use doctrine favoring
independent categorization. Search engines help sort out the over-
load of information, the maximizing paradigm and reduction of
searchcosts. “[C]ategorizationprojectsare sonecessary tocounteract
the negative effects of information overload that they deserve posi-
tive recognition in the first fair use factor”. Ibid. at 184. On privileged
fair use for categorizers (perhaps even to be manifested as a specific
fair use provision for categorizers) that can produce ‘sub-factors’ like
transformative use and commerciality are to the first factor analysis
(e.g. privilege for categorizers should be proportional to the scope of
works categorized and the openness of the categorization project).
Ibid. at 186-9. See also, Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as Information
Policy, Google Book Search from a Law and Economics Perspective, Innova-
tion Policy and the Economy (Vol. 9, Josh Lerner, Scott Stern, eds., NBER,
2008), available at: http://www.ipcolloquium.com/Programs/Media/
Lichtman_on_GBS.pdf.
68 See, Hannibal Travis, Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes for
Authors, or Napster for Books?, 61 U. Miami L. Rev. 87, 139-151
(October 2006).
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the US Supreme Court Sony Betamax case and more
recently in the MGM v. Grokster case. Google can also
justify its practice of scanning as a form of ‘interme-
diate copying for archival purposes’,69 making
a distinction between technical and substantive
infringement or copying.70
There is thus a hierarchy of protection by the proposal of
immunity for archiving and indexing functions and fair use
defenses for display (i.e. indexing with snippets with no
subsequent display or non-substantial follow-on display),
which constitutes the minimal threshold of permissible activi-
ties based on social importance. Other rights can be left to
market forces and private agreements (i.e. substantial follow-
on display and full book display for free, subscription or
purchase as determined in an anti-competitive and non-
monopolistic manner).
3.8. Private solutions: Google’s strategy, legal tactics
and best practices
In the meantime, Google will have to work within the
confines of the existing law and it should improve its fair-
ness quotient by business strategy and market them that
way as such (which Google is actually already doing) such as
by: Offering a platform for the outreach of creative works by
creators and access to knowledge by society, which is the
very purpose of the copyright law; preserving rare and out-
of-print works and making them available and more acces-
sible; offering free access and services to the blind; making
available only snippets of copyrighted works; promoting
works and linking to retailers (benefiting authors and
publishers); other actions that will cast it in a more favorable
light under the fair use factors test (e.g. preview, new
marketing and e-book alternatives); and generally acting in
good faith and showing diligence in producing technology
and best practices (e.g. a streamlined complaints process)
that can help resolve the issue and reduce the conflict.
These acts are also useful and supportive arguments for
seeking an overhaul of the copyright regime or the extension
of immunity and exemptions. In the process, Google should
consider the needs and concerns of both authors (including
moral rights) and publishers (profit-driven) that are the
main opponents of its project to better alleviate their
grievances and minimize threats of legal action against
itself.
Google should also segregate and provide differential treat-
ment fordifferent typesandcategoriesofworks tomaximize the
benefits of non-infringement (i.e. falling outside coverage of
copyright law) and the protections of the fair use doctrine (i.e.
falling inside coverage of the fair use defense).71 For example, it
shouldmakeavailableonlysnippetsof copyrightedworks,while
it can offer greater portions and even full transcripts of public
domain works and other works that enjoy lesser protection.
4. Section II - Considerations and
recommendations
The important assessment throughout this paper is to deter-
mine if Google as an Internet intermediary is a facilitator and
hence should be protected or a perpetrator and should be
sanctioned. The proposal will constitute a compromise that
allows Google to function as it does currently while placing
a level of responsibility for it to earn legal exemption from
infringement.
4.1. Fundamental policy considerations
The fundamental policy considerations have been canvassed
in Part One of this paper. To reiterate, both public and private
interests should be taken into account in relation to the
creation of such technologies and their benefits to society as
well as the effects they may have on copyright objectives.
Public interest considerations will include those previously
stated in Part One. Particularly of relevance here include the
storage of knowledge and organization of information. Private
interest considerations basically relate to those of concern to
the relevant Internet intermediaries and copyright owners.72
4.2. Summary of approaches to law reform
Insofar as approaches to law reform are concerned, similar to
the recommendations in Part One, the most feasible
approaches will be either to extend statutory safe harbors,
create new exemptions or to refine and expand the fair use
factors to provide more certainty and better guidance in
determining the legitimacy of a technological function.
There should be a comprehensive and concerted solution
and answer to every aspect and performance of a search
engine such as those identified in this paper and a ‘content
neutral’ solution will be useful to meet potential disputes in
69 The amount of copying is necessary to create an efficient
directory, the material at this point is not provided to users and is
shared with libraries and the copyright owner’s market for the
work is not negatively impacted but may instead benefit from
greater exposure.
70 Determined to be fair in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811,
820-21 (9th Cir. 2003) (deciding that the copying of entire photo-
graphs in order to make thumbnails did not weigh for or against
Arriba Soft with respect to factor three) and Sega Enters. Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514-16 (9th Cir. 1992) (detailing the
process used to copy the code).
71 Graduated response to display of works (e.g. snippets for
copyrighted works to the full display for works in the public
domain). Moreover, more studies can be conducted to distinguish
the nature and types of works and how they stand up against
a fair use analysis, including whether the work is in the nature of
a magazine or journal article or a book or treatise, fiction or non-
fiction, and so on.
72 E.g., Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Facebook, Yahoo, Other Web
Giants Back YouTube in Viacom Case (The Wall Street Journal, 31
May 2010), available at: http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/05/27/
facebook-yahoo-other-web-giants-back-youtube-in-viacom-case/
and Matthew Lasar, Internet Democracy at Stake in Google/Viacom
Lawsuit? (ars technical, 29 May 2010), available at: http://
arstechnica.com/web/news/2010/05/post-5.ars.
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the future as technologies continue to emerge in relation to
search engine functions. Statutory reform will also be more
useful to resolve the issue and avoid uncertainty and unnec-
essary litigation, which can impede technological progress.
There should also be global consistency andharmonization
of policy and laws because search engines like Google operates
worldwide, the Internet and WWW functions across borders
and transactions aredonewithindifferent jurisdictions aswell
as among different parties. This can be done by establishing
a worldwide working group or authoritative body under the
auspices of an international organization to set rules and
guidelines to establish thepermissible parameters aswell as to
determine the legitimate procedures and processes relating to
the operation of technologies. The recommended law reform
and amendments proposed in this paper should also be taken
up by the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the (World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) with a view to their
incorporation into the international copyright regime.
4.3. The proposed approach to law reform
Traditionally, safe harbor extends to Internet intermediaries
with respect to their role in the dissemination and distribution
of third party material. Their role have evolved within the
function of an information locator tool (e.g. for images search)
aswellas in itsdiversificationof roles thatare related to itsbasic
search function (e.g. caching, archival and hosting facilities).
These functions can be controversial but are no less important,
integral and useful to navigating the WWW. Perhaps it is time
that this should be reflected in the safe harbor laws.
A reform of the safe harbor provisions as recommended
can be considered a significant move as it will be the first time
that such statutory protections covering the copyright regime
goes beyond the litmus test of “control” that is the mainstay
and the key determinant of protection under current provi-
sions in both the US and EU.73 It will also be the first foray into
the statutory protection of an Internet intermediary for first
party content or as the primary party; for example, the actual
exercise of certain exclusive rights by Google and other search
engines performing the same role or function without first
seeking permission from the copyright owners as in the case
of the GIS and GBS. Moreover, the conditions for safe harbor
relating to “control” such as adherence to the notice process
and showing a lack of the requisite “actual knowledge” or
“awareness” and “no direct financial gain” will have to make
way for more liberal qualifications or conditions such as an
objection or ‘opt-out’ procedure. The effect of such a safe
harbor will also entirely protect the search engines as
a statutory right, which can be used as a sword against
aggrieved plaintiff copyright owners who would carry the
burden of proof to surmount the claim of immunity. It
restrains an action for copyright infringement from
proceeding if applicable.
Alternatively, the same exemptions can be made within
the copyright statute as new and additional specific statutory
exceptions or be relegated to a fair use defense. This will
provide the search engine and other intermediaries providing
the same or similar services the opportunity to shield or defend
itself from a cause of action initiated by the copyright owner.
The plaintiff copyright owner has the right to sue and the
provisions do not, unlike the previous case, protect the
defendant from an action being instituted against it. In this
case, the exemption falls within the copyright regime and the
defendant bears the burden of proving eligibility to the
defense against an allegation of infringement. In this situa-
tion, the threat or possibility of a civil suit can have chilling
effects on practices, especially amongst less powerful
intermediaries. Statutory exemptions are not new and there
are many such limitations within the copyright itself as well
as in other statutes.74
4.4. New safe harbor provisions or specific fair use
exemptions for search engine archiving function and
indexing tools
Together with Part One, I have identified two main functions
with significant social benefits that outweigh the protectionist
interests of copyright holders and for which statutory general
protections or specific exemptions should be extended. They
are the archiving and indexing-related functions.
The proposed new statutory provision to exempt
archiving-related functions should be subject neutral, thereby
extending protection or exemption to any Internet interme-
diary that performs the same function within the definition
and scope of the provision. Thus, the legalization of the
archiving function can cover a range of activities from caching
practices such as that in Field v. Google, Inc.75 to the practice of
scanning and storage under the GBS project and YouTube’s
practice of providing storage facilities for UGC. This proposed
provision will not extend to the display or broadcasting of the
content or material, but only to the reproduction and storage
of such material.
Similar to the indexing-related functions of its other forms
of searches, the index and search functions necessitate the
73 Currently, the liability of intermediary service providers
provisions in the EU E-Commerce Directive (Directive, 2000/31/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market) and the copyright
provisions in the United States’ Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(7 U.S.C. xx 512, as amended by the Online Copyright Infringement
Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA)) contain conditional safe harbor
provisions for basic functions relating to Internet access and
indexing including transitory network communications, system
caching and basic information location tools (i.e. hyperlinking to
illegal third party websites).
74 Currently, copyright statutes provides limited purpose-
specific exemptions such as for criticism or review, for the
reporting of current events, for judicial proceedings or profes-
sional advice and for collections of works for the use of educa-
tional institutions and libraries. More recently there have also
been more of such limitations in relation to electronic and digital
interests like the defences for making back-up copies of
computer programs, decompilation, the use of copyrighted
computer programs for observation, study and testing, and so on.
Limitations also sometimes exist in other statutes. For example,
the United States’ Audio Home Recording Act (Pub. L. 102-563, 106
Stat. 4237 (1992)) permits the making of copies of audio record-
ings for non-commercial personal use in certain circumstances.
See 17 U.S.C. x1001-10.
75 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
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display of portions of literary works and other relevant
information such as bibliographic data. Thus, the safe harbor
or statutory exemption for indexing, proposed under Part One
for images and related search engines, is likewise applicable
to, and useful for, literary and purely information-based
search indexing. A simple example of how such a protection
or exemption can look is provided in Table 2.
These amendments, together with the existing safe harbor
provisions, will effectively permit and legitimize the following
activities or functions currently practiced by Google (and the
same or similar functions of other online entities) in relation
to digital archives cum search engines e
1. Scanning and indexing of materials for the purpose of
archiving and user-catalogue identification services with
reasonably adequate security (to prevent unauthorized
access through hacking and perhaps requiring insurance)
(first party duplication and limited display).
2. Providing hyperlinks (including deep links)76 to third party
websites that may contain illegal copies or commercial or
non-commercial websites that may offer legal copies of the
work (e.g. on request, subscription or sale basis). This
exemption applies beyond books search to all literary
materials like news agents and blogs (third party material).
4.4.1. Instituting a “removal request process” in addition to
the notice process for protected activities not relating to third
party material
For the same reasons as stated in Part One, the “removal
request process” should be provided as a fair compromise,
which will allow objectors to opt-out of any aspect of Google’s
search engine processes through a simple, clear and more
formal streamlined process. The provision of such a facility
and adequate response and enforcement should be made
a pre-condition for eligibility to statutory protection (i.e. safe
harbor or specific exemption under the Copyright Act), and is
included in the proposed provision in Table 2.
4.5. Updated fair use factors under the general air use
exception provision
As in the case of PartOne, theother optionwill be tomakeuseof
the general fair use defense to extend protections for archiving,
and particularly for indexing functions to search engines. The
recommended factors will remain the same and apply just as
well to the GBS as it does to the GIS. The reasons for the rec-
ommended amendments to the fair use provision have already
been canvassed in Part One and reference can be made to it.
The proposed amendment to the current fair use provision
is reproduced below in Table 3.
4.5.1. Reconciling the fair use doctrine and its expansive
effects with the international obligations under the Berne Three-
Step test
The main intellectual property and copyright-related inter-
national law instruments contain a three-step test for
assessing the validity of exceptions to the exclusive rights of
copyright owners. The same requirements can be found in
Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention,77 Article 13 of the TRIPS
Agreement,78 Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty,79 and
Article 16 of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty.80
The Berne ThreeeStep is arguably not an impediment to
the creation of specific statutory exemptions in whatever
form, whether as a safe harbor protection or as a purpose-
specific exemption, provided that the three conditions are
met.
First, under these conditions and according to the “fixed
view”, exceptions should be allowed for specific purposes and
not generalized exceptions. Second, the exception must not
conflict with normal exploitation of the work, that is, it must
not interfere with the normal use of the work by the rights
holder.81 What constitutes normal exploitation can evolve “as
a result of technological conditions or changing consumer
preferences.”82 Third, it must not be unreasonably prejudicial
to right holders’ legitimate interests (mainly to do with
a significant loss of revenue from the use by the exempted
party).
The flexible but general fair use doctrine itself has been the
subject of criticism based on the test although it is to be noted
that the doctrine has survived and thrived for decades and it
has even expanded jurisdictionally and been transposed into
the copyright laws of other countries. It is also to be noted that
the US was not obliged to amend her fair use provision when
she joined the Berne Convention in 1989.
There is a schism between those that prefer a strict and
narrow reading of the three step test andwho also require the
three elements to be individually satisfied and those that
have a more liberal and flexible reading of the test that
76 This excludes ‘system hacking’ or other technological
methods that circumvents limited or secured access technologies
that are instituted on certain websites (e.g. requiring subscription
and password, acceptance of terms in a click-wrap link, etc.).
However, it includes deep linking into websites where no such
technology is instituted but that the website creator or adminis-
trator intended, expressly or otherwise, for visitors to enter
through the homepage or otherwise fulfil other conditions (such
as reading the terms of use under a browse-wrap link) for further
access. This balances the convenience and interests of the content
host and service provider vis-a`-vis the copyright holder.
77 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Work of September 9, 1886, July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3, 31.
78 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299,
305. This Article was derived from the Berne Convention.
79 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty,
art. 10, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, 71.
80 World Intellectual Property Organization: Performance and
Phonograms Treaty, art. 16, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76, 85-86.
81 See, Jo Oliver, Copyright in the WTO: The Panel Decision on the
Three-Step Test, 25 Colum. J.L. & Arts 119 (2002). “Empirical
approach” or “normative approach” or both? Ibid. at 155-57. See
also, Annette Kur, Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water e How Much
Room for Exceptions and Limitations Under the Three-Step Test?, 8
Rich. J. Global L. & Bus. 287 (2009), for a more flexible interpre-
tation of the test.
82 Ibid. at 158. Existing conditions and usual use or a more
forward-looking form of assessment under a “dynamic view”?
Ibid. at 159.
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recommend a holistic application of the test. Depending on
which school of thought, it is argued that the recommenda-
tions that are made in Parts One and Two still satisfies the
requirements, particularly the suggested statutory amend-
ments to incorporate purpose-specific protections or
exemptions. Certainly, it can be argued that both the
archiving and indexing functions are special cases and not
the usual form of exploitation of the works e in fact these
arguably ‘transformative’ uses are supplementary to the
normal uses of the works and are even complementary to and
enhances the value and normal exploitation of the works so
as to overall promote the legitimate interests (especially
commercial interests) of the copyright holder (provided of
course that safeguards against potential abuses are instituted
to prevent or minimize potential detriment, such as the
‘leaking’ of such works to the public domain or direct
commercial and competitive exploitation of the works in
a similar manner as rights holders’). Surely whatever form it
takes for the protection of these functions, these legitimate
purposes should not be overlooked.
4.6. Practices determined to be unjustified and not
eligible for protection
Although the suggested reforms made above are favorable to
Google there are some current practices and actions that
should not be eligible for protection, and hence the industry-
wide practices or abuses relating to these practices should
cease, unless private arrangements or settlement agreements
are made that does not go against public policy interests. For
the GBS, it includes providing more than mere snippets of
existing copyrightedmaterials that fail the normal application
of the fair use factors test. It may still fulfill the fair use criteria
upon the application of the fair use factors on a case-by-case
basis if it is operationally optimized and infringement is
minimized.
Table 3 e Example of proposed amendments to the U.S. fair use provision.
The fair use of a copyrighted work is not an infringement of a copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include [but are not limited to]:
1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes and
whether such use is of a transformative nature or is for a consumptive purpose;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work and the nature of the use, including personal use;
3. the amount and substantiality
a. of the portion, including its used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole and substantiality includes format, size, resolution and
other features of use that distinguishes it from the original work;
b. of infringing uses as compared to non-infringing [in relation to the services of a technological medium or media for communication
and transfer];
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work; and
5. the copyrighted work was used in good faith and reasonable and proportionate measures have been taken to protect the copyrighted
work from infringement.
Table 2 e Template for a safe harbor or statutory exemption provision for the archiving and indexing functions.
Archiving of informationa,b
A service provider shall not be liable for the copying of any information for the purpose of archiving or for the purpose of making more
efficient the function of indexing the information, on condition that the provider, upon receiving a removal request, acts expeditiously
to remove the copy of the information,c and on condition that reasonably adequate security is put in place to prevent unauthorized
third party access to the information.d
Indexing of information
A service provider shall not be liable for the modification and display of information in an directory, catalogue or index for the purpose
of organizing information, and shall also not be liable for providing the technical means to transport a user to its source, whether
or not as an information locator tool in relation to search results, for the purpose of making more efficient the function
of indexing the information, on condition that the provider, upon receiving a removal request, acts expeditiously to remove the
copy of the information.e
a “Information” will include any form or type of online material.
b Although the anti-competition concerns, which is the other major legal issue relating to the project is beyond the scope of this paper, these
concerns can be also be separately resolved as noted earlier in the paper such as through the institution of statutory cross-carriage of goodswith
a royalty or compensation scheme for themandatory sharing of archivedmaterials with other search indexers as well as for any potential social
good or service.
c I.e., request from the copyright owner preferring not to be included in the archive or index, or informing that the source of the information is
illegal. There also needs to be put in place a proper set of procedure and process for the filing of such requests (and the evidence or information
needed, perhaps in a template) and the response to such a request (by the service provider, including the reasonable reaction time).
d What would legally constitute reasonably adequate security may also have to be statutorily set out in the samemanner as the conditions for
secured electronic signatures have been set out in the UNCITRALModel Law on Electronic Signature and in national legislation on e-signatures.
e However, other existing conditions for eligibility will have to be excluded for obvious reasons such as the requirement of an effective policy to
deal with instances of repeat infringement (by another) and the support of standard technical measures for the protection of works (except
insofar as Google itself does not circumvent such measures). See, 17 U.S.C. x512(i).
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5. General conclusion: a truce between
Google and the creative empire with the law as
the arbiter e instituting legal support for a fair
and just compromise
Search engines such as Google will continue to innovate, and
although the ulterior or secondary motives may be financially
driven and they may sometimes go beyond what is justified,
that does not mean that the technological changes in service
do not have great social benefits. Each function should be
looked at with a view to policy accommodation or otherwise
and these should be clearly enunciated under the law so that
they do not stunt the growth of the industry and the
advancements in technology, while helping to avoid unnec-
essary litigation. This should be done periodically and with
some frequency e and it is submitted that the safe harbor and
fair use provisions vis-a`-vis search engine technology is
overdue for review and amendments given the developments
on several fronts as apparent from the above analysis as well
as the evaluation of the GIS in Part One.
Before I conclude, some provisos have to be made to the
paper as a whole. Although Google is used as the obvious
subject for a case study on the policy and law on information
locator services and the functions it entails and that are devel-
opedpursuant thereto, the analyses andproposals aremeant to
apply to all search engines and other entities that perform the
same functions with the same or similar objectives. Also,
although the analysis here is in relation to the US law, with its
rich history of litigation and jurisprudential analysis and law,
both statutory and judge-made, to regulate and facilitate tech-
nological progress and the Internet and WWW,83 the same
issues and problems faced in other countries and regions are
largely similar and require a similar consistent.84 In fact,
a harmonized solution on a global scale will do a lot more to
resolve the problem, particular since Internet interactions and
transactions are essentially worldwide.
Finally, inanswer to thequestionposed inthe titleat thevery
beginning of this paper: Google is a perpetrator or a facilitator as
defined by law. In most cases, Google is a facilitator whose
functions should be protected, and where it perpetrates or
enables infringement, the protections will not exist and it will
continue to face infringement liability under copyright law. The
legitimacy of its role and functions can change through law
reform. The exercise in this paper is to set out clearly the
existingand theproposedboundariesbetween thesedefinitions
as applied to Google’s operations canvassed under both Parts
One and Two. It is hoped that the suite of recommendations set
out in both Parts will be considered for legal reform, or at the
very leastwill serveas a springboard for discussionswith aview
to legal reform. Lack of clarity in the law, will only lead tomore
uncertainty and constant disputes over its roles and functions.
The analysis in this paper is to find a suitable and fair compro-
mise for all parties concerned that can bring a state of conver-
gence between the private disputants, which will at the same
time fulfill the overall objective of law and policy in the case of
the copyright regime, which is to optimize the benefits of
creative works to society as a whole. Promoting the reach and
availability of such works is paramount.
Postscript
On 22 March 2011, the US Federal Judge in New York before
which the legal settlement was brought rejected the deal
citing copyright, antitrust and other concerns.85 In particular,
the over-extensive effects of the ‘opt-out’ mechanism, the
potential monopolistic effects of the agreement and the
treatment of orphaned works and unclaimed books under it
were highlighted as causes for concern.86
Even though the decision is a substantial roadblock to the
continued operation of the GBS, it does not necessarily
terminate the future potential for the digitization of literary
works. The Judge himself acknowledged that “the creation of
a universal digital library would benefit many,” and of its
societal benefits evenwhen he found that the current terms of
the proposed agreement was “not fair, adequate and reason-
able.” The implication is that an agreement that is fair,
adequate and reasonable in the form of a revised agreement
could be acceptable. The door is not closed as the judge denied
the motion for approval without prejudice, which means that
it will reconsider the settlement if the parties can renegotiate
a revised agreement. Thismerely brings the parties back to the
negotiating table towork out amore acceptable solution in the
eyes of the court. Meanwhile, the other alternative, whichwas
proposed bymany opponents of the deal, is for the enactment
of legislation to deal with the problems and to offer a more
comprehensive, balanced and public solution. The Judge like-
wise stated that in the matter of unclaimed books that it is “a
mattermore suited for Congress”.87 This is consistentwith the
proposal in this paper on just such a legislative solution in the
context of copyright law (although other ancillary and addi-
tional legislative amendments will also have to be prescribed
taking into account all the other issues and concerns).
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